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We analyze the contractual relation between workers and their employers when there is
nominal risk. The key feature of the problem is that the consumption deflator is random and
observed sometime after the effort is exerted. The worker’s effort is not observable, and to
induce the agent to work, second-best contracts do not insure the worker fully. They do
eliminate all nominal risk for the parties (by fully indexing the terms of the contracts to the price
level) but they would be re-negotiated. Foreseeing this, the parties to the contract will write one
that is renegotiation-proof. Under such a contract, nominal shocks affect real consumption.
Since the argument should apply in many situations, it will have macroeconomic implications,
one of which is short-run non-neutrality of money. We have found that surprise money is likely
to redistribute consumption and welfare towards workers, and away from shareholders.
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and NBER1. Introduction
A contract written in nominal terms exposes the parties to price-level risk. Full
indexation to the price level is a device for eliminating such risk. Our paper shows that when
nominal data are gathered with delay, a fully indexed contract would be renegotiated by the
parties to that contract. That is, fully indexed contracts are not time consistent, not renegotiation
proof. But contracts that specify an uncontingent nominal payment are not renegotiation-proof
either.
When contracts are not fully indexed, monetary policy will affect the real terms of those
contracts, and hence it will affect real variables. In general; three types of explanation have been
proposed for how money affects real variables: “Menu Costs” models assume it is costly to
change prices -- Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), “Surprise Money” models assume money
influences expectations and affects spot market trades which can not be undone after the money
shock is revealed -- Lucas (1972), Azariadis (1978), Eden (1994). “Asymmetric Injections”
models assume that a subset of agents gets monetary injections -- Grossman and Weiss (1983),
Rotemberg (1984), Christian and Eichenbaum (1992).
Because price expectations are built into contracts, ours is a “Surprise Money” paper. It
applies to the markets of the many goods and services that are traded not in impersonal spot
markets but as part of a contractual arrangement. We focus on the contract between the firm and
the worker. No nominal rigidity is imposed on the contract; since effort is unobservable, to
elicit effort the firm does not insure the worker filly. Instead, the contract says the worker
should get more money when his nominal output is high, and when the price level is high, When
nominal output is observed, the worker’s real reward is still uncertain because the price level is
observed with delay. At this point, effort has been sunk, and so the principal may as well fully
insure the agent against price-level risk. So, the principal now guarantees the agent a
consumption whose level depends on the nominal output alone. But the latter reflects the money
supply, and so money has real effects.
Two implications emerge. First, the worker gets more when price surprises are positive,
so that labor’s share is positively related to price surprises, and that the nominal wage varies
more than the real wage [the latter is documented for the U.S., U.K., and Japan in Table 1 of
Gordon (1982)]. It also means that the firm’s price markup over cost should be negatively
related to price surprises. Benabou (1992), Blanchard andMuet(1993), and Kaskarelis (1993)
document this. A related implication is that positive money shocks raise the real wage, which is2
consistent with evidence in Table 5 of Christian andEichenbaum(1992).
The second implication is that surprise money lowers stock-returns. This explains the
finding that unexpected inflation is negatively related with real stock prices -- Fama(1981, p.
545), Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986, tables 2 and 4), Chan, Chen, and Hsieh (1985, table 2), and
Blanchard (1993, table 7). So, money has distributional effects even though we assume money
is distributed in proportion to existing holdings.
Two final points: The model does m explain nominal rigidity; renegotiation-proof
contracts are not fully indexed, but nominal transfers do depend on money shocks. Also, a
random money-supply rule strictly lowers welfare -- a stronger result than in Lucas (1972) who
showed only that predictable money-supply rules lead to a Pareto optimal equilibrium.
Section 2 gives the intuition for our results, while section 3 describes the equilibrium
model. Section 4 presents the main welfare theorem, while section 5 gives the positive
implications, Section 6 discusses the key assumptions, section 7 discusses some issues and
problems, and section 8 concludes the paper.
2. The Intuition
Here are three related principal-agent problems that contain the intuition for our results.
Problem 1 is the standard principal-agent problem. Problems 2 and 3 present the parties with
price-level risk in a partial equilibrium context.
2.A. PROBLEM 1: A risk-neutral principal hires a risk-averse agent. The principal can not
see the agent’s effort, only output, y. The agent’s effort influences y as follows:
F. (y) s Probability {output < y effort = n}
Just two effort-levels, n e {O, 1} are possible. The agent’s preferences over consumption c,
and effort n, are
U(c, n) = U(c) - en.3
The parameter e is the marginal disutility of effort. The principal’s utility is y -c. Assume that
the principal wants the agent to choose effort n = 1. Because n is not observable, contracts can
not condition on n. Instead, the second-best contract specifies that the principal should pay the
agent an amount c = c(y) if output should equal y. Let c*(y) denote the second-best contract.
This contract will not insure the agent filly (otherwise the agent would not choose n = 1). That
is, c*(y) can not be constant.
2.B. PROBLEM 2: Just like Problem 1, but now y is not directly observed by either party.
For instance the principal could be the shareholders of a company, and the agent may be the CEO
responsible for launching a new product. The quality of the product, y, is not observed and
almost impossible to even define independently of sales. Instead, both parties see 2 signals
separately. The first signal is “nominal output”, denoted by s, which is given by
s= Xy.
Here x is the price level. It is observed, and it is the second signal. Since y E s/x, the
contract c*(s/x) will yield the same utility to both parties as in Problem 1. The
nominal transfer is xc*(s/x), and it is homogeneous of degree one. This is a fallv indexed
~ -- the two parties are filly insulated from nominal-induced variations in their
consumption. That is to say, the relative state-contingent prices -- the payments the agent gets in
various states y -- do not depend on x. So money is neutral in the traditional sense of the word
-- it affects neither real allocations, nor relative prices. Price shocks can be neutralized because
effort is predetermined regardless the shock, and parties consume afier the shock is observed.
2.C. PROBLEM 3: Just like Problem 2, but now x is observed (by both parties) with some
delay. The signal s is observed first, immediately afier the effort is sunk. The agent also knows
n (the effort level he has chosen), but so does the principal, because he can infer it in equilibrium.
At this point, then, the two parties have the same beliefs over x. Suppose that the realized value
of this signal does not filly reveal x, so that the conditional density of x, call it g(xl s), is
nondegenerate. Since c*(.) is not a constant function, this implies that c*(s/x) will be a random
variable even if s is given. Now we shall show that, given the option to renegotiate, both parties
will prefer a contract different from c*(s/x). Denote the realized value of the random variable s
by SO. Having seen this signal, the expected utilities of the principal and agent [if they stick to
the contract c*(s/x)] are4
(2.1) J[ Solx - C*(so/x)] g(xl So)dx and ~u[c”(solx)lg(xl So)dx
Now write C(SO) for the certainty-equivalent of the random variable c*(sO/x). That is, let C(SO)
solve the equation
UIC(SO)] = j U[c*(sO/x)] g(xl So)dx.
Since U(.) is strictly concave,
C(so) < ~ C*(So/X)g(x[ So)dx.
The principal is therefore strictly better off if he can induce the agent to accept C(SO). But the
agent would accept such an offer, since he is [by definition of C(SO)]indifferent. The intuition is
that at the renegotiation stage, the tension between insurance and incentives has disappeared:
effort has been sunk, the incentive compatibility condition is no longer relevant, and the principal
should insure the agent ~. But then since both payoffs in (2.1) depend only on SO (and ~
on x), ~ renegotiation procedure that leads to a point on the contract curve will have as its
outcome a level of consumption for the agent that depends only on SO,
2.D, ~: In designing contracts that will not later be renegotiated,
the parties will choose a contract from the class c = C(s). That is, contracts under which the
worker’s consumption depends only on s. Moreover, C(s) will have to depend on s; if it did
not, it would be full insurance contract, and would therefore not elicit any effort from the agent.
But if C(s) depends on s, then a nominal shock x will have real effects because it will
influence s.
2.E. ~ ivision of the Die: The effort level n is chosen before x
is realized. Therefore output does not depend on x. The division of output, on the other hand,
will depend on x, and what is more, this dependence will likely be systematic. In particular,
assuming that FI is stochastically larger than FO, the contract will provide the “right”
incentives if the function C(.) is increasing, at least for the most part. But then the agent’s share
in output will be increasing in x, and the principal’s share will be decreasing.
2.F. N~f A nominally-rigid contract specifies a
nominal payment, say W. It therefore specifies a consumption level of W/x. As shown in 2.C.,such contracts are not renegotiation proof.
2.G. Kev assumptions: That the nominal shock x will have real effects hinges on the
following key assumptions embodied in Problem 3, and each of them is necessary:
(a) The principal can not see the agent’s effort. Otherwise the principal could contract
based on effort directly, and insure the agent fully,
(b) The quality of the output is not filly observed. Otherwise, real consumption could
depend directly on y as in Problem 1.
(c) s is observed immediately, x only with some delay, Otherwise, if boths and x
were observed immediately, we would have the situation described in Problem 2, in which the
principal can guarantee the agent a real wage directly on the basis of real output. On the other
hand, if (a) failed and both s and x were observed with delay, then renegotiation would take
place right afier effort is sunk, and the result would be full insurance in which x would be
neutral.
(d) The two parties can not avoid renegotiation. Otherwise, the second-best contract of
Problem 2 would be attainable.
These assumptions probably hold in many settings. We shall return to them in section 6.
3. The Model
The examples in the last section assumed different attitudes towards risk by principals
and agents. With a stock market, such differences in attitudes arise endogenously, as we shall
now show in a monetary economy.
~: There are 2-period lived overlapping generations. Effort takes on just two
values: 1 and O. If a person exerts effort= 1, their lifetime utility is U(c) - e, where c is the
consumption of efficiency units, which occurs in old age, and where e is the disutility of a unit
of effort, exerted when young. If no effort is exerted, lifetime utility is simply U(c). The young
work and their output is sold on a spot market to old agents, who simply consume it.
Storage and production: The young are born with an endowment of K > 1 units of the
consumption good that they do not wish to consume, The endowment perishes too quickly to be
marketed to the old agents. A young person can do one of two things with K. He can store it, in
which case he gets ~K units of the consumption good in the next period. Or he can, at the
beginning of the period, use it to buy shares that entitle him to dividends at the end of the period,6
which he can use to finance consumption in old age. There is also a production technology.
Firms can produce output with labor and capital. Let y denote the quality of the output. The
realization of the firm’s output y is uncertain, and has a distribution conditional on labor input,
n, and capital input k. If k < 1, the firm will produce no output at all, and for k >1, the
marginal product of capital is zero. So, the firm will want exactly 1 unit of capital. Also, the
firm can hire at most one worker, who supplies effort n ~ {O, 1}. Let
F.(y) = Probability {outputs y I effort= n, and k > 1 }.
Assume that under low effort the production sector can not “get off the ground” :
(Al) JydFO(y) < ~
.
[which implies that U(~K) > j U[y + ~(K-l)]dFO(y)]. This means that firms will have to elicit
high effort from their workers if they are to provide them with more utility than the workers can
get by simply investing their capital in storage, This means that there can be no equilibrium in
which workers make low effort. Second, assume that under high effort, the average product of
capital exceeds its return in storage (both measured in utility):
(A2) ~ U[Y+ ~(K-l)ldF,(y) - e > U(~K).
(Al) and (A2) imply that even if the individual incurred all the risk from production, he would
want to exert effort, Normalize ~ ydF,(y) s Y = 1
The monev-suu~ly rule: The supply of money at the start of a period is denoted by m.
The money supply rule consists of an injection (x-1)m of nominal balances, distributed in
proportion to existing holdings, and so only the old get money injections, and that these
injections are proportional to their wages when young. The post-transfer money supply is mx.
We set m = 1 throughout, and assume that x is i.i.d., with CDF G(x), and with density g(x),
Unobservable quality: We assume that y is not directly observed by the principal and
the agent, as in the new product example of section 2. This makes sense if y stands for the
quality of a differentiated product, or a product whose characteristics are hard to enumerate and
describe objectively -- say a personal computer, or the services of a company’s CEO. The7
assumption that y is not observed makes sense especially if people disagree about quality, as is
the case in the following model -- an infinite-number-of firms version of the model in Perloff and
Salop (1985), but without their restriction that each consumer buys at most one unit of a good.
A differentiated product market: Let ci denote the total number of efficiency units of
output consumed by buyer i. Consumers have McFadden-type random preferences over the
infinite number of differentiated products supplied. The output of firm j contributes to c i an
amount z i ,j per efficiency unit; z i ,j is i.i.d over i and j, with an upper bound of z ~., . This
means that if the quality of firm j‘s product is yj, consumer i’s consumption of efficiency
units is effectively equal to yj z i, j,and the consumer derives utility U( yj z i, j) .This consumer
will buy from whichever firm offers him the largest number of efficiency units per dollar spent.




We now show that there is a number p such the price pj = pyj is an equilibrium price. That
is, the equilibrium price per efficiency unit will be p. We start out by supposing that
p k/yk= p. Since there are an infinite number of firms, the above inequality states that with




Since Zi,j < Zmw, this mess that yj /p j > l/p, that is, p j < p yj . TO sell any output, the
firm’s output must cost no more than p per unit of efficiency. And at a price less than p, the
firm’s price per efficiency unit will be less than its competition, and there would be infinite
excess demand. Aggregate nominal supply is pY = p (since Y = 1). It must equal aggregate
nominal demand, x, and so
p=x.
Therefore, in its effect on the price level. money is neutral. Each seller sees only his own sales s
= xy, and cannot disentangle x from y.
It is important to note that the seller sees his sales (i.e., his own price per unit of quantity)and @ his own sales right away. Since he doesn’t see the sales of other sellers this is not
enough to reveal the price level x to him, because he does not know the quality of his product
relative to that of other sellers,
Given income w and given x, the buyer consumes z~.Xw/x with certainty. So z ~,,
behaves as a parameter of the utility function, and we shall set it equal to 1.
The labor market: The “price” of a young worker is an incentive-compatible contract,
W(S,x), which specifies the nominal amount the worker is to get as a finction of the sales that he
generates, s, and as a function of the money-supply shock, x.
Firms: There are one-period-lived firms, that are liquidated at the end of the period.
They have access to the production technology described above. These firms are traded at the
begiming of the period. The firm requires exactly 1 unit of capital (that dies with the firm at the
end of the period), and they can employ exactly one worker. Under full employment, the number
of firms will equal the number of young agents, which also equals the number of investors, and
the measure of each is unity, Suppose that a firm signs a wage contract with its worker that
specifies how much the worker will get if sales equal s, and if the price-level shock is x.
Suppose that the contract is described by the finction W(S,x). The firm’s dividend then is
6(s, x) q s - W(S>x).
Since they need exactly one unit of capital to operate, the supply of firms is infinitely
elastic at the price of unity. So the equilibrium price of each firm is 1, and since the measure of
all firms is 1, the total equity investment by the young will, in equilibrium, equal 1. Of course,
dividends will need to be such as to make investors m to hold the right fraction of safe and
risky assets in their portfolios.
The portfolio decision: Young investors are born with an endowment of K, This
endowment is perishable -- it perishes too soon to be sold to old agents, and is therefore of no
value to the young agent unless it is invested right away. If stored, it yields a unit return of ~.
[Although one can think of storage as the return obtained from a fully-indexed safe asset, like an
indexed Treasury Bill, formally, we treat storage as a process that each consumer undertakes
himself, and the proceeds of which he consumes directly].
Total investment, K, will consist of R units in the risky asset (the risky market9
portfolio) and the remaining K - R units in the safe reset. If u j denotes the share of firm j‘s
shares in the investor’s risky assets, investor i’s nominal assets at the end of the period will then
be
R~ ~j~(sj, x)dj + x~(K -R)+ w(si , x)
where w(si, x) is the wage paid by the firm that investor i works for.
If fn(y) is the density of the distribution F.(y), the density of s conditioned on x is
X-lfn(s/x). The realizations of y are assumed to be independent across firms, and the dividend
on the risky market portfolio in state x is
(3.1) 6(X) = ~ [S- w(s,x)] X“fl(s/x)ds
Let C(S,x) be the worker’s consumption if he ends up with sales s when the price level is x,
and his portfolio allocates equal weight to all firms. Then (anticipating the equilibrium
allocation of R = 1),
(3.2) 6(x) + x~(K - 1) + W(s, x) C(s, x) = Y
x
Also, let h.(s, x) s (l/x)fn(s/x)g(x) be the joint density of s and x conditional on effort.
~: Firms are traded at the outset, among the young. The demand-price
of a share in firm j is defined to be Vj in units of the consumption good.
PROPOS ITION 1: The market value of firm j is
Vj = ~-‘ ~ 6(X){~ [~(sj) X)/X] X-’ fl(sj/ X)dsj }dx = ~- ‘ E{ 6(X) ~(sj, X)/X }
where
(3.3) 0(x) =
~ U’[c(s,x)]hl(s, x)ds E{U’(.) I X} — — —
~ UJ[C(S,X’)]h,(s/x’)g(x’)dsdx’ ~ E{U’(.)1 x’}g(x’)dx’10
is the (normalized) expected marginal utility of income in state x.
PROOF: In the appendix. n
If all fires follow the same W(S,x) policy, the value of the market portfolio is
(3.4) V = ~ -1 ~ 8(X) [6(x)/x] g(x) dx = ~ -1E{ 6(X) b(X)/X }
Equilibrium in the market for shares: The expression for Vj is the demand-price for a
firm’s shares as a function of the properties of the firm’s dividend. We assume that firms can not
store capital and return it in the form of dividends or in the form of wages at the end of the
period. Firms need capital only for productive purposes. Therefore, firms demand exactly one
unit of capital -- per firm and in the aggregate. Firms will not want to pay any more dividends
than it takes to extract this unit of capital from the investors, and certainly they can’t get enough
capital if they pay less. In equilibrium, then, Vj = V = 1. This means that to attract capital,
firm j must pay dividends such that E { e(x) b(sj, x)/x } > ~. This inequality is imposed as a
constraint on problem (3.7) below; however, since the firm will not want to pay any more than it
has to, this constraint will hold with equality.
Note three things about the stock market equilibrium. First, if x is not random (x = 1),
there is no aggregate risk, and no risk-premium. Since (3(1) = 1 and V = 1, (3.4) implies
that 5(1) = ~ , a no arbitrage requirement.
Second, when x is random, each firm uses 0(x) to value its real profits in state x,
because this is how its shareholders will value their dividend incomes in that state. Its dividends
are distributed to the cross-section of workers. The formula for Vj is the familiar one: Firm j is
worth more if b(sj, x) is positively correlated with the marginal utility of consumption. Also, in
general, there is a risk-premium associated with the diversified portfolio, in that ~ -‘ E{5(x)/x}
# 1. As the proof of Proposition 1 shows, the “excess return”, 6(x)/x - ~, satisfies the
equation
Je(x)(5(x)/x - ~) g(x)dx = O.
And third, the stock of a worker’s own firm is significantly correlated with his income.11
So why not hold (or sell short) a significant fraction of his portfolio in his ~ firm? We shall
see that this is exactly what the optimal wage contract does for the worker -- it gives him the
optimal weight in his portfolio of his own firm. The worker’s holdings of his own firm’s shares
depend of his incentives.




Given a contract w,
guarantee himself an
a worker who has sales s, but who does not yet know the price level can
expected utility of
U“(S;W) ~ ~U[6(X)/x + P(K - 1) + W(S,x)/x] g(xl s)dx.
The firm can guarantee its shareholders the expected payoff
V*(S; w) = J e(x) [s/x - W(S,x)/x] g(x Is)dx.
For any TC ~ [0, 1], any s, and any contract WO, let
Q(s, WO,n) ~ argmax ~ {nV*(s; w) + (1 - n)U*(s; w)}
subject to V*(s, w) > V*(s, WO),U*(s, w) > U*(s, WO),and Os W(S,x) < s for all x.
These two constraints express the fact that both parties must agree to a renegotiation. As n
varies between zero to one, we trace out the contract curve (in the Edgeworth box sense) between
the utilities defined by V*(s, WO)and U*(s, WO)(this is true because since the problem is
convex in w, the utility-possibility curve is concave to the origin). In particular, n = Otransfers
any “interim” rents to the worker, and TC = 1 transfers them to the firm.
The following definition says that a renegotiation-proof contract must be Pareto Optimal12
for each s, given the parties interim preferences: 2
DEFINITION 1: A Renegotiation Proof Contract satisfies w ~ U ,, . 0(s, w, x) .
Consider the maximization problem that defines Q(.). Form the Lagrangean, with the
multipliers u(s) and ~(s) attached to the two constraints:
g(s) = nv”(s; w) + (1 - Z)u”(s; w) + U(S)[V*(S, w) - V’(S, w,)] + X(S)[U*(S,w) - U“(S, w,)]
+ ~ E(S,X) [S -W(S,x)]g(x I s)dx.
The multipliers u(s), x(s), and C(s, x) are nonnegative because ~(s) is decreasing in the
constraint parameters V*(s, WO),U“(S, WO),and s. This leads to the first order condition that
must hold for each (s, x). Differentiating with respect to W(S,x),
- g(s, x) - [m+ u(s)] e(x)/x + [1 - n + x(s)] (l/x)u’(.) = o,
The second-order derivative with respect to w is everywhere negative because U (and therefore
U*) is concave, while V* is linear. From the above, we get the following expression:
(3.5)
LEMMA 1: A contract
consumption-level
U’[c(s, x)] =
x C(S,x) + [n + u(s)] e(x)
[1 - n + x(s)]
w is renegotiation-proof if and only if it affords the worker a
(3.6) C(S, x; y) q mu{a(x)ix + P(K-1), rein{ [S+ 5(x)11x + P(K - 1), u’-’ [@(x)Y(s)] })
where the function y(.) is real-valued, and does not depend on x.
PROOF: “Only if”: Solving (3.6) for w(.), we observe that if &(s,x) = O, C(S,x; y)< [s+
2 Our renegotiation-proof allocation is interim Pareto optimal and unique given u n,
so there is no renegotiation process under which both parties would agree to change this
allocation. Maskin and Tirole (1992) formalized this notion as strong renegotiation proofness.13
6(x)]/x + P(K - 1) and noting that n, u(s), and X(S)do not depend on x, shows that in this event
C(S,x; y) = U’ -][f3(x)y(s)]. On the other hand, C(S,x) > 0 implies that the constraint binds,
so that in this event, C(S,x; y) = [s + 8(x)]/x + P(K - 1). Finally, if y(s) were such that C(S,x;
y) < 5(x)Ix + ~(K-1), wages would be negative.
“If”: First, such a contract satisfies the limited liability condition. Second, it can not be
bettered on the region of (s, x)-space on which it satisfies limited liability strictly. More
specifically, for all (x, x’,s) such that C(S,x) = ~(s, x’) = O, the contract equates the ratio of
the two parties marginal utilities of real income:
0(x) u’ [C(S> x)] — —
e(x’) U’[c(s, x’)]
Among contracts in which the worker’s real compensation depends only on aggregate risk, this
contract is Pareto optimal -- it is on the contract curve. Third, it remains to be shown that the
worker would reject any fair gamble that would transfer income from states in which C(S,x) = O
to and from states in which E(s, x) > 0. But the worker would take such a gamble only if it
transferred consumption from states in which U’(c) is low, to states in which it is high. But it
follows from (3.6) that his consumption is lowest (and hence his U’ highest) in the states
where C(S,x) >0, and the firm can not transfer consumption to this state without violating the
limited liability condition. n
Note first that if 6(x) were constant (which it will be when the utility function is
quadratic), y(s) is just the worker’s marginal utility of consumption. The second consequence
of the lemma is stated more formally:
COROLLARY: Lotteries (i.e., random finctions w) at the renegotiation stage are not
renegotiation-proof.
-: suppose WOwere a lottery, a function of S,X,ti a random variable. Extending the
definitions of V* and U* in the obvious way, the only way WOenters the maximization
problem is though the scalars V*(s, Wo) and U*(s, We). Because the agent is risk averse, the
constraint-set is still convex. Setting WOto its mean (conditional on (s, x)) makes the agent
_ better off without violating either rationality constraint. H14
The optimal contract: We now formulate the firm’s decision problem in light of the
constraint that any contract it chooses must be renegotiation-proof. The firm uses contracts W(S,
x) to bid for workers under the added constraints that its shareholders get the market rate of
return V, and the limited liability constraint. Omitting the j subscript, the firm, taking (3(x)
and 6(x) as given, solves the problem of maximizing its worker’s utility:
(3.7) Max ~U[c(s, x)] hl(s, x) dsdx - e ,
w(.)
subject to the constraint that its shareholders get at least the market rate of return,
~e(x)~[slx - w(s,x)/x]h,(s,x) dsdx z ~,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint that ensures effort is elicited,
~~u[c(s,x)l{hl(s, x)- b(s,x)} dsdx - e >0,
subject to the limited liability constraint,
s- W(s, x) 2 0,
subject to a non-negative wage constraint, w z O,and subject to the constraint that the contract
be renegotiation proof. Here C(S,x) is given by (3.2). Now in view of Lemma 1, we know
that the non-negative wage constraint, the limited liability constraint, and the renegotiation-
proofness constraint will be met if we substitute C(S, x ; y) for C(S,x) in the above problem
and then let the flrrn choose y(s) instead of w(.). After this is done, the Lagrangean is
(3.8) ~ = ~U[C(S, x; Y)] h,(s,x)dsdx
+ ~ ~6(x){~ [s/X+ P(K - 1) + 6(X)/X - C(S, X ;y) ]hl(s, X)ds}dx
+ p [~U[c(S, x ; y)]{hl(s, x) - L(S, x)} ds dx - e ]15
DEFINITION 2:
satisfi equations
Equilibnum consists of five functions: y(s), 5(x), 0(x), W(S,x) and C(S,x) that
(3. 1) - (3.3), (3.6) and the restrictions in the maximization problem (3.7).
THEOREM 1 (EXISTENCE): Suppose that
(i) The supports of FO, Fl, and G are finite intervals, excluding zero.
(ii) f, and fO are Lipschitz finctions.
(iii) U(c) = ~ + ac - (1/2b)c2, with ab > y~., + P(K - 1)
Then an equilibrium exists.
PROOF: In the appendix. H
4. Welfare
THEOREM 2 (RANDOM MONEY-SUPPLY RULES STRICTLY REDUCE WELFARE):
When monetary policy is random, welfare is strictly less than in the case where money supply is
constant (or deterministic).3
PROOF: The standard principal agent problem without renegotiation is a concave programming
problem, and the optimal (second-best) contract is deterministic. This is seen by taking the
worker’s utility level as the control. The second-best contract is also unique. Under the constant
money supply rule, there is no delayed signal, x, and hence the second-best contract is
renegotiation proof. In this contract, U’ must depend only on y, that is, only on the ratio s/x. If
an equilibrium contract under a random monetary rule were to yield the same utility, U’ would
have to depend only on the ratio s/x, because only then would the agent’s real compensation not
a fmction of the random variable x. Now this would hold in (3.6) if limited liability were to
bind for all states, but then there would be no dividends, and no shareholder would want to invest
in the firm. Therefore E(s, x) = Oon a set of (s, x) of positive fl - measure. On that set,
however, (3.6) implies that O(x)y(s) must depend on s/x only, and non-trivially so in view of
3 The results inHolmstrom(1979) and Shaven (1979) suggest this result. Their
logic is: If x is random, s is not a sufficient statistic for y. Since x adds information about
y, it should be used together with s to allocate real consumption to the agent (and our
renegotiation proof contract i~nores x in setting real consumption). But if x is nonrandom, s
k a sufficient statistic for y. There is no further informative signal, and the Holmstrom-Shavell
results no longer imply that the renegotiation proof contract is inefficient -- indeed the
renegotiation proof contract is then second-best.16
the incentive compatibility condition. We now derive a contradiction to this last statement. Eq.
(3.3) says that (3 is proportional to E{U’(.) I x}, and since the distribution of the ratio s/x is
independent of x, E{U’(.) I x} must be independent of x. Therefore, (3(x) must be constant.
But then e(x)y(s) is independent of x, which can only be true if O(x)y(s) does not depend on
Slx -- a contradiction, H
Lucas (1972, Theorem 5) proves that equilibrium under a predictable money supply rule
is Pareto optimal the class of non-random allocations, i.e., allocations that depended on the real
shock alone. Our Theorem 2 says more: Predictable money strictly dominates a random money-
supply rule.
5. Positive Implications
THEOREM 3 (MONEY HAS REAL EFFECTS): Changes in x alter the consumption of a
subset of agents of positive measure.
PROOF: Suppose x was neutral. As in the proof of Theorem 2, the worker is risk-averse, and
this warrants at least partial insurance. Therefore &(s,x) = Oon a set of (s, x) of positive fl -
measure. Neutral money implies that 6(x)/x is a constant, and the equilibrium contract would
be of the form W(S,x) = xW(s/x) for some finction W(.). Then from (3.6), this would imply
that 6(x)y(s) would be a function of the ratio s/x only. And since 6(x) is constant, this means
that y(s) [=y(xy)] is a constant, except on a set of zero fl-measure. But then the incentive
compatibility condition to problem (3.7) could not be met. _
Subtracting 5(x)/x + P(K - 1) from C(S,x; y) in (3.6), real wages are,
(5.1) w(xy, x)/x = min{y, U’- ‘[em] - [b(x)/x + P(K - l)]}.
Aggregate output is unity, and so labor’s share is
(5.2) 1- a“(x) = ~ [w(xy,x)/x]dF,(y).
and 5*(x) ~ 5(x)/x is the share of asset holders. Substituting from (5.1) into (5.2) and
subtracting 5*(x) from both sides leaves us with the implicit fmction that relates 5*, 6, and y17
as follows:
(5.3) 1 = ~ rein{ y + 6*(x), U’-‘[em] - P(K - 1)} dF1(y)
THEOREM 4 (INFLATION LOWERS STOCK RETURNS): If
(a) The likelihood ratio f,(y)/fO(y) is increasing in y, with a slope that is
bounded away from zero,
(b) U(c) is quadratic as specified in Theorem 1,
(c) Var(x) is sufficiently small,
then the share of capital 6*(x) is decreasing in x, and the share of labor, 1- 6*(x), is
increasing in x.
m: The proof proceeds in five steps:
(i) Suppose that for each fixed y, 6(x)y(xy) is an increasing (decreasing) function of
x. Since neither y nor P(K - 1) depend on x, for (5.3) to continue to hold when x changes,
5*(x) must move in the opposite direction from U’-1[Of]. And since U’-1 is a
decreasing fanction, this proves 6*(x) is increasing (decreasing) in x as d(x)y(xy) is an
increasing (decreasing) function of x.
(ii) If U is quadratic, 6(x) is a constant, This is because U’ is linear in c, so that in
(3.3), E{U’[c(s, x)] Ix} just depends on mean consumption, which equals Y + P(K - 1) for all x.
(iii) From (i) and (ii), if y(s) is monotone increasing (decreasing), so is 5*(x).





1 + p[ 1- T,(s)/r,(s)]
where ~.(s) E j h.(s, x)dx, for n = O, 1. Neither k nor p depend on s, and they both are
strictly positive because the constraints they refer to in problem (3.8) are binding. Therefore,
y(s) is decreasing in s if the ratio rl(s)/rO(s) is increasing, and vice-versa.
(v) As Var(x) gets small, g(x) converges to a unit mass on x =1, and ~n(s) converges
to f.(s). Condition (c) then guarantees that y(s) is a strictly increasing function.
The assertion now follows from claims (i) through (v). n18
6. Discussion of the key assumptions
6.A. Asvmmetrv of risk attitudes. Even if preferences are arbitrary, a second-best risk-
sharing contract generally differs from a renegotiation-proof contract, and so nonneutrality per se
does not hinge on this asymmetry. But proposition 4 does require it. It arises naturally if there is
a stock market. It could also arise from different tastes, as in Kihlstrom andLaffont(1979).
6.B. A~encv ~roblem: If there were no agency problem, risk-averse agents would be fully
insured. But this is evidently not true; most contracts contain incentive clauses.
6.C. Neither t)artv can see y: Output is hard to observe when the product is differentiated, or
complex, or new. Quality is ofien defined by the price that the product sells for -- new goods are
an example. And how does one measure the quality of a complex job such as that of a CEO or of
the marketing or sales division without seeing the sales figures?
6.D. x is observed with delay. It takes time for the CPI (the empirical counterpart of x) to
be gathered reliably (Bullard, 1994) But in the U.S. economy at present, the variance of the CPI
is small, and there are other signals about the price level that the firm can use:
(a) If the firm has other workers doing the same thing, x can be precisely estimated if the
workers are many, and if their y’s are independent, which they probably rarely are.
(b) Aggregate signals about the price level such as interest rates and the money supply
are imperfectly correlated with the price level. Even money-supply announcements are
substantially revised -- see Mankiwetal(1984).
6.E. Parties can not avoid renegotiation: One way to avoid a renegotiation is to officially
involve a third party who gets a payment in the event that the original contract is renegotiated, or
to officially restrict the frequency of meetings. But it is known that such commitments can be
circumvented at the interim stage through unofficial “side contracts”.
6.F. No real shocks: In the model, x denotes the supply of money, ti the general price
level. In the real world, the two do not coincide. If we put in real shocks, we would free up the
relation between the two. The price level, x, would depend on both the money shock and the
real shock, and agents would need to forecast both. But nothing else would really change. For
example, there might be shocks to the velocity of money.19
7. Other issues
7.A. Other ex~lanations for the ne~ative relation between inflation on stock returns: First, if
the money-supply is fixed and velocity is constant, a spurious relation can arise: A favorable
shock to output will raise output supplied and lower the equilibrium price level, thereby causing
a negative correlation between output and the price level. Fama(1981) and Kydland and
Prescott (1990) make this point. But the evidence in Chen, Chan, Ross and others refers to a
p- correlation between surprise inflation and stock returns; they include Industrial Production
as a separate regressor separately in their regressions, and this variable should capture the
aggregate shock effect. Second, perhaps liquidity lowers the probability of bankruptcy and
allows weaker firms to survive. Third, the effect may be policy-induced: After a positive
inflation surprise, the market may expect the Fed to tighten the money supply. If this would
ordinarily lead interest rates to rise through a liquidity effect, the market may rationally
anticipate this, and induce stock prices to fall. Finally, taxes are not indexed -- e.g., depreciation
allowances are nominal. When inflation is high, their real value goes down, and so does the
value of the firm. Maher and Nantell (1983) discuss nominal tax-effects in detail.
7.B. Micro evidence on indexation: Proposition 4 says that real wages should rise with a
money shock, or that the elasticity of the nominal wage with respect to price surprises should
exceed unity. Micro evidence on the whole does not favor this implication. In panel data, Card
(1990) and McLaughlin (1994) find an elasticity of only %. Keane (1993), however, finds that
manufacturing real wages do rise with Ml shocks, and this (together with Christian and
Eichenbaum’s evidence that money shocks raise the ~ ~re~ate real wage) provides some support
for our result.
7.C. Other inte mretations: Our model could apply to other principal-agent situations. The
principal may be a firm’s headquarters, and the agent a subsidiary or franchise, and where
headquarters has imperfect information about events in its franchise -- an informational
asymmetry that Radner (1992) has recently stressed. Or the principal can be a group of
shareholders and the agent could be the management. Under the first interpretation, our model
suggests that small firms -- risk averse franchises -- should do better relative to large firms during
monetary expansions. In line with this, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch
(1994) find that money distributions disproportionately stimulate small firms, and Chevalier and
Scharfstein (1995) find markups to be more cyclical for small firms than for large firms.
7.D. Related literature: Closest to what we do is Azariadis (1978). He introduces risk-sharing20
between workers and firms intothe Lucas (1972) mode1. Redivides agents intotwo types:
workers and entrepreneurs. The main difference is that he assumes (a) contractible effort
(chosen &r the price shock is realized) and (b) no stock market.
8. Conclusions
We have analyzed an equilibrium principal-agent model when there is nominal risk. The
key feature of the problem is that the consumption deflator is random and observed sometime
afier the effort is exerted. This would not matter if effort were observable and contractible; in
this case, first-best contracts would insure the agent, and they would be renegotiation-proof. But
effort is not contractible, and in order to induce the agent to work, second-best contracts do not
insure the agent fully. They do eliminate all nominal risk for the parties (by fully indexing the
terms of the contracts to the price level) but they are not renegotiation-proof.
Foreseeing the renegotiation, the parties to the contract will write one that is
renegotiation-proof. Under such a contract, nominal shocks affect real consumption. Since the
argument should apply in many situations, it will have macroeconomic implications, one of
which is short-run non-neutrality of money. We have found that surprise money is likely to
redistribute consumption and welfare towards workers, and away from shareholders.
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Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Let R denote the size of the investor’s risky portfolio, and K-
R the size of his safe portfolio. Suppose he puts a fraction (1 - c) of his risky investment in a
diversified portfolio of all firms other than firm j, and the remainder in firm j. The number of
shares of firm j that he buys is c~j, and if each other firm’s price is V, his holdings of each
other firm will equal (1 - c)W. The dividend income from this portfolio is
[(1 - E)~]~6(sJ, x)dJ + [&~j]b(sj2 X) = [(1 - E)~]b(x) + [E~j]6(sj, X)
The equality follows because by the law of large numbers,
~b(s,x)dJ = ~~(s,x)(l/x)fl(s/x)dx q 5(x).23
The cost of this portfolio is just R. Investor i’s expected utility then is
~U(x-’{(l-c)R~(x)~ +&Rb(sj,x)Wj + x~(K-R) + ~(silx)})x-]fl(sj/x)dsjhl(si,x) dsidx.
From now on, we drop the subscript i. The first order condition for a maximum with respect to
&is:
[~j]~x ‘]U’(.) ~(sj, X)X“fl(sj/x)dsjhl(s, X)dsdx - [w]~U’(.)b(X) hl(s, x) dsdx = O
(because ~ x-lfl(sj/x)dsj = 1 integrates outofthe second term). Evaluating U(.) at 8=0,
VjN=
~{~ U’[c(s>x)]hl(s> x)ds} {~ ~(sj>x)x-’fl(sjlx)ds j}dx
~~ U’[c(s,x)]b(x)x -lhl(s,x)dsdx
In equilibrium, ~ 5(sj)x) x ‘]fl(sj/x)ds , = 6(x), so that Vj /V = 1. Finally, the condition of
optimality for R implies
~U’[c(S,X)]{b(X)/XV - ~} h,(s,x)dsdx = O,
and the claim follows. n
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: By Lemma 3, when the utility tiction is quadratic, 6(x) is a
constant. Problem (3.7) now no longer depends on e(x), as the latter is proportional to 1/x. The
proof has 5 steps. The first four steps deal with problem (3.7), They show that a solution for y
(a) exists, (b) is unique, (c)is in a Lipschitz fmily with a constant that does not depend on 6,
and (d) is continuous in 6. Step (e) shows that the reverse map, from y to 5 is continuous,
shows that the composite mapping y + 5 + y is continuous, and applies a fixed point theorem.
We now describe each step in detail.
(a) Existence of optimal y. Then y(s) is the marginal utility of consumption. Since x
and y are bounded, so is s. Therefore the control y(s) maps a bounded interval in R into R.24
The y are bounded uniformly. From below, it is bounded away from zero by the inequality in
(iii), which in view of the limited liability condition makes it impossible for consumption to ever
reach its bliss level of ab (the level of consumption at which marginal utility is zero). Functions
y that fall below this value can be replaced by other functions that give the parties the same
payoffs. By a symmetric argument, we can bound y(s) from above as follows: Since K >1,
consumption is bounded from below by the payoff from private storage. The definition of C(S,
x; y) does not allow the firm to affect the worker’s consumption through negative wages even if
it should choose a function y that would imply a negative wage. Therefore neither the criterion
nor the constraints are affected by any y that violated this constraint. Therefore we know that if
a maximal y exists, its range will lie in a compact subset of the line. Next, we shall constrain y
to a fmily of Lipschitz fanctions, and show [in (c) below] that this constraint does not bind at
the optimum. With the sup norm II. Ilonfunctions y, the space of controls is then compact. The
two constraints confine the controls to closed subsets of this compact set, and therefore the set of
admissible controls is compact, The criterion is clearly continuous in y. Therefore, by
Weierstrass’s theorem, a maximal y exists.
(b) Uniqueness of optimal V. Because of the incentive compatibility constraint, we need
a theorem that does not require convexity of the control set -- Theorem 2 of Luenberger (1959,
p. 221). Every assumption in that theorem is met here. We have two real-valued constraints, so
the dual space is R2 . The Lagrangean (3.8) is Frechet differentiable in y, and y affects it
only through C(S,x; y), which on the unconstrained region equals U’- I(y(s)) = b[a - y(s)].
Applying the chain rule, the first-order condition is that for all s,
(b.1) - {T,(s) + p [~,(s) - To(s)]} y(s) + AT,(s) = 0,
where r,(s) q ~ hn(s, x)dx. The second order condition is
(b.2) T,(s) + p[rl(s)- To(s)] > 0
Because the integral is a sum, (b.2) ensures the global concavity of the Lagrangean in y at the
point (A, ~). From (b. 1)
(b.3) y(s) = AT,(s) /{T,(s) + p [ T,(s) - T,(s)]}
The numerator of (b.3) is positive. The denominator coincides with the left hand side of (b.2).25
Since y(s) must be strictly positive, (b.2) is met. Thus we have shown that a unique maximum
to the Lagrangean exists for the control y(s) for (~, p) fixed.
To show that this is also a unique maximum for the problem (3.7), one still has to show
that (A, p) are unique. First, if A is given, then p will be uniquely defined. The reason is as
follows: both constraints must bind at the optimum. If there was more then one value of p,
(b.3) shows that the incentive compatibility condition would not bind at one of these (divide
numerator and denominator by ~ l(s), and observe that dy/ds is increasing in p). So the
incentive compatibility condition could not bind at more than a single p for a given 1. So
conditional on A, p is unique, and it is enough to show that A is unique. From Luenberger
(1969, p. 222, Theorem 1) A is the derivative of the maximized criterion with respect to ~ if
this derivative exists. Since 6(x) = 1, since on the unconstrained region - W(S,x) = P(K - 1)
+ 5(x)/x - C(S, x ; y), and since on that region C(S, x ; y) = b[a - y(s)], the constraint reads
f{s +~(K- 1) +b(x)/x -b[a- y(s)]} hl(s,x)dsdx z ~,
where the domain of integration is (s, x) for which C(S,x) = U’-‘(y(s)). Let yP be the optimal
policy at ~, and v(P, y) the criterion evaluated at the policy y. Let v(~) denote the
maximized criterion, i.e., v(~) = v(P, yP). When ~ shifis up by an amount A, the
shareholders constraint will be met if a new policy y* is put in place under which ~ b[y~(s) -
y(s)]} hl(s, x) dsdx = A, To attain such a transfer to the shareholders, a feasible policy that does
not disturb the incentive compatibility constraint is one that transfers a constant marginal utility
of income. Since the marginal utility of income in state s is y(s), the worker must give up
D/y(s) units of consumption in state s to give up D utils in that state. We are about to define
these policies in terns of first order derivatives, so that for fixed A >0, there will be an error
that (because U(.) is analytic) is of order O(A2) . So consider the policies yA(s)+= yP(s) +




D-(A) = A/$ [b/yP +A(s)]hl(S, x)dsdx. The policy yA(s~ is feasible at ~ + A, which means
(ignoring terms of order A2),
v(P + A ) > V(~, yA+) = V(p) - D+(A),
and the policy yA(s)- is feasible at ~. This means that
v(~) > v(~, YA+ ) = V(p) + D-(A)26
Therefore
- D+(A) < V(P + A ) - V(p) < - D-(A)
A A A
We substitute from the definition of D(.) to conclude that the right-hand side and the left-hand
side of the above pair of inequalities must converge to the same well-defined limit as long as
~[l/yP(s)]hl(s, x)dsdx is continuous in ~. And using the fictional form in (b.3), this could fail
only if the criterion itself was discontinuous in ~. But this would contradict Berge’s Theorem of
the maximum.
(c) A unifo rm Lipschitz constant. (b.3) implies y(s) = ~/{ 1 + p [1 - r,(s)/ r ,(s)]}.
Since y(s) is bounded uniformly in [s, 6(.)] and since A and p do not depend on s, it follows
that A and L/p are finite. Then it is sufficient that ~l(s)/~ ~(s) be Lipschitz. Now ~.(s) =
J (1/x)f~(s/x)g(x). Since by (i) x isboundedawayfromzero, and by(ii) f, and fOare
Lipschitz, So y(s) is Lipschitz with a constant not depending on 5(.).
(d) Continuit v of v in 6 and 0: We use the sup norm 11.11 on 6 as well. Since y is in a
Lipschitz fmily, yl(s) - yz(s) pointwise in s is equivalent to Ilyl - yzll + O. So we only
need to show that y(s) is continuous in 5 at each s. From (b.3), this follows if A and p are
continuous. Now the criterion and the constraints are continuous in 6, and so by Berge’s
theorem of the maximum, the set of maximizing values for y(s) is u.h.c. in 5, since by (b)
above it is unique, it must be continuous.
(e) Existence of equilibrium v: We shall use Schauder’s fixed point theorem, as stated in
Theorem 17.4 of Stokey and Lucas (1989). Lipschitz failies are equicontinuous. The set of
bounded functions y discussed in (a) is convex. With the sup norm, b [defined in terms of y
by (3.6) (3.2) and (3.1)] is continuous in y. That is, given y, equation (3.6) yields c, which
is then used in (3.2) and (3.1) in that order, to get values for w and then 6. Given this value for
b the problem (3.8) then yields a new solution for y. This defines a continuous map from y-
space into itself that goes as follows: y + w + 6 + y. Schauder’s theorem then gives us a fixed
point. n